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Nature of the Case 
This is a case wherein Respondent sold real property located in Canyon County, 
consisting of a residence and a car trim business, to Appellant. Respondent alleged that there 
\Vas an oral agreement for Respondent to buy back the property at some point in the future. 
Respondent attempted to state causes of action for breach of contract, specific performance, 
unjust enrichment and fraud against the Appellant for his refusal to sell the property back to 
Respondent under the alleged oral agreement. Appellant was the prevailing party at trial and 
moved for attorney fees and costs. Appellant was awarded costs but not attorney fees. 
Appellant's motion for fees was based upon the contract between the parties and on the 
commercial transaction language of LC. § 12-120(3). This appeal addresses only the District 
Court's decision to deny Appellant his requested attorney fees. 
B. Statement of Facts 
In 2011, Respondent David Kosmann owned real property located at 1020 W. Homedale 
Road, Caldwell, Idaho. R. at 13. The property consisted of two acres: one acre contained a 
home and two shops and the acre next to it was bare ground. Tr. at 6, II. 5-9. At that time, the 
property was worth approximately $130,000.00 and Respondent had a loan on the property for 
approximately $260,000.00. Tr. at 15, Ii. 10-13. Respondent attempted to modify the loan and 
to refinance but was unsuccessful. Tr., at 15, 11. 14-18; 16, 11. 2-5. Respondent began trying to 
a an to out the at IL l 18. 
On September 24, 2012, Respondent and Appellant into a Purchase Sale 
Agreement. Tr., at 32, 11. 6-8; Trial Ex. O; R. at 26-34. Closing was December 26, 2012, and a 
Warranty Deed transferring the real property to Appellant was recorded on December 27, 2012. 
R. at 25. As a result of the short sale, Respondent was relieved of approximately $160,000.00 
worth of debt to GMAC, his mortgage lender, who agreed to release him of his obligations. Tr., 
at 94, IL 18-21; 100, IL 8-25; 101, IL 1-6. 
On January 25, 2013, approximately one month after the closing, Respondent filed an 
action attempting to enforce an alleged oral agreement he claimed to have had to buy back the 
property. R. at 12. The Complaint alternatively stated a claim for unjust enrichment, seeking to 
have approximately $31,000.00 returned to Respondent. R. at 13-15. On January 28, 2013, only 
three days after the Complaint was filed, Appellant made an Offer of Judgment for $32,500.00. 
R. at 120-21. The Offer of Judgment was rejected and the parties proceeded through two years of 
litigation, culminating in a jury trial commencing January 27, 2015. R. at 66. 
On January 29, 2015, at the close of Respondent's case in chief, Appellant moved for a 
directed verdict. R. at 66. The Court granted the motion as to Respondent's specific 
performance claim, holding that "the evidence did not establish a contract sufficiently definite in 
its terms to be specifically enforced." Id. The Court denied the motion as to Respondent's 
claims for fraud and unjust enrichment. As the remaining claims for breach of contract and 
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covenant of 
Respondent's only remaining claims at that point were the fraud and unjust enrichment claims. 
Id. The parties stipulated to having the remaining claims decided by the Court. Id. In its 
Memorandum Decision Following Court Trial, the Court found for Appellant on the fraud claim. 
R. at 79. The Court found for Respondent on the unjust enrichment claim, and entered Judgment 
on March 27, 2015, in the amount of $30,990.00, R. at 88-89, over two years after Appellant's 
Offer of Judgment for $32,500.00. 
Following the decision, both Respondent and Appellant moved for attorney fees and 
costs. The District Court found that Appellant was the prevailing party for purposes of costs, and 
that decision is not an issue in this appeal. The District Court also determined that, while 
Appellant was entitled to an award of costs, he was not entitled to an award of attorney fees 
under either the contract between the parties or under LC. 12-120(3). Whether the District Court 
erred in making this decision is the only issue in this appeal. 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's motion for attorney fees 
based upon the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement between the 
parties? 
2. Did the District Court err in denying Appellant's motion for 
attorney fees under Idaho Code § 12-120(3 ), by determining that 
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was not a 
3. Is Appellant entitled to attorney fees on appeal to the contract between 
the parties or I.C. § 12-120(3)? 
III. ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred in Concluding that the Contract 
Between the Parties Did Not Support an Award of Attorney 
Fees 
1. Appellant \Vas the Prevailing Party For Purposes of An A ward 
Of Costs and Fees 
Rule 54(e)(l), Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that "[i]n any civil action the 
court may award reasonable attorney fees, which at the discretion of the court may include 
paralegal fees, to the prevailing party or parties as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B), when provided 
for by any statute or contract." I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). In this case, the District Court found that 
Appellant was the prevailing party as defined in Rule 54(d)(l)(B) for the purposes of an award of 
costs and attorney fees: 
Based on the analysis set forth above in connection with 
Defendant's Motion to Disallow Plaintiff's claimed costs and fees, 
the court concludes, in the exercise of its discretion, that Defendant 
is the prevailing party in this action, for purposes of an award of 
costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 54( d)( I) and attorney fees. 
Order on Motions, at 8; R. at 154. This conclusion is not at issue in this appeal, nor is the 
decision of the District Court to allmv costs to be awarded to Appellant in the amount of 
$1,732.25. Rather, the issue on appeal is whether, after determining that Appellant was the 
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party for purposes costs m 
Appellant was not entitled to under contract the parties or under 
12-120(3). 
2. Appellant Is Entitled To Attorney Fees Pursuant to the Real 
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement Between the Parties 
Pursuant to Rule 54( e )(1 ), as the prevailing party, Appellant is entitled to an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to the terms of the Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (hereafter 
"Agreement"), which provides as follows: 
28. ATTORNEY'S FEES: If either party initiates or defends any 
arbitration or legal action or proceedings which are in any wav 
connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party is entitled to 
recover from the non-prevailing party, reasonable costs and 
attorney's fees, including such costs and fees on appeal. 
§ 
Def. Trial Ex. 0, at 7; R. at 59 (emphasis added). This entire lawsuit is connected with the 
Agreement entered into between the parties on September 24, 2012, for the sale of the real 
property at issue in this case. If that Agreement had not been made in the first place, then 
Respondent would not have had any claim regarding an oral purchase back agreement and would 
not have had any claim for fraud based upon the entire transaction between the parties. Thus, 
pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Appellant is entitled to his costs and fees as the 
prevailing party. 
In holding that Appellant was not entitled to fees under the terms of the Agreement, the 
District Court held that "because the alleged oral agreement for reconveyance of the property was 
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Sale Agreement]" Appellant 
not prevail on its claims regarding the Property Sale Agreement, he was not entitled to attorney 
fees under its provisions. This holding ignores the plain language of the Agreement. 
The plain language of the Agreement provides that if a party is forced to defend a "legal 
action," which is in "any way connected with this Agreement" the prevailing party is entitled to 
an award of costs and attorney fees. The Agreement does not provide that attorney fees are 
allowed only for claims based upon the Agreement, which is how the District Court read the 
Agreement. Essentially, the District Court held that because the Appellant did not prevail on his 
claim based upon the Agreement, he was not entitled to fees. This narrow reading contradicts the 
plain language of the Agreement, which provides not that attorney fees are allowed to the 
prevailing party only on claims based upon the Agreement, but that fees are allowed to the 
prevailing party on the entire action if forced to "defend" a claim "in any was connected with the 
Agreement." 
The District Court separated the claims and undertook an analysis of each claim, and held 
that because Appellant did not prevail on one claim to enforce the Agreement that he was not 
entitled to fees in defending the entire action. However, the plain language of the Agreement 
states that in defending any "legal action" connected with the Agreement, the prevailing party is 
entitled to fees. It does not state that in defending or initiating any "claim" under the Agreement 
the prevailing party is entitled to fees. The Agreement does not invite a breakdown of the causes 
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a it that in 
the prevailing is entitled to attorney this case, the District 
that Appellant was the prevailing party in the action as a whole, and because the action as a 
whole was "connected" vvith the Property Sale Agreement, Appellant is entitled to attorney fees 
under the plain language of the Agreement. 
Had the Agreement contained language to the effect that attorney fees are available to the 
prevailing party on actions "to enforce the terms of the agreement," such language might have 
supported the conclusion of the District Court in this case. However, that is not the language of 
the Agreement between the parties in this case. Had the parties to this action wanted to limit 
attorney fees only to those claims to enforce the Property Sale Agreement, they could have used 
such language. They did not. The plain language of the Agreement in this case is much more 
broad and is not limited only to actions to enforce the terms of the Property Sale Agreement. 
Rather, it encompasses the defense of any action "in any way connected" with the Property Sale 
Agreement. 
The Complaint in this action, which Appellant was forced to defend against, was clearly 
"connected" in some way with the Agreement. Respondent's claims for breach of contract, 
specific performance and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing involved an oral 
contract to sell back the very property which was the subject of the Purchase and Sale 




Property Agreement. Respondent's unjust enrichment claim was that he provided 
Appellant with the funds for the down payment under the Purchase and Sale Agreement and that 
it was inequitable for Appellant to retain those funds and retain the Property. Appellant had 
made a Rule 68 Offer of Judgment exceeding the amount of that claim and was in fact the 
prevailing party on that claim, which was clearly connected with the Purchase and Sale 
Agreement. Respondent's fraud claim was essentially that Appellant induced him to enter into 
the Property Sale Agreement under fraudulent terms and that he suffered damages as a result: the 
loss of his property under the Property Sale Agreement which he claims he would not have 
signed had he known of Appellant's actual intentions to keep the Property and enforce the 
Agreement. 
Courts in other jurisdictions have read language in real estate contracts allowing attorney 
fees in any action "arising out" of the agreement to include fraud claims even if the contract 
claims have been dismissed. See eg,, Lerner v. Ward, 13 Cal. App. 4th 155, 161 (Cal. App. 2d 
Dist. 1993 ). In Lerner, plaintiffs sued the defendants for falsely representing that property they 
purchased could be subdivided. Id. at 167. The plaintiffs stated claims for breach of contract, 
fraud and negligence but dismissed the breach of contract claim. The defendants sought attorney 
fees under the terms of the real estate contract, which provided for fees to the prevailing party on 
legal actions "arising out" of the contract. In allowing an award of fees based upon the contract 
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the court "[t]he to a contract validly to allow 
attorney's even though the suit is based on tort rather than contract." Id. (quoting Skyway 
Aviation, Inc. v. Troyer 147 Cal.App.3d 604, 610-611 (1983); Wagner v. Benson, IOI 
Cal.App.3d 27, 36- 37, 161 Cal.Rptr. 516 (1980)). Because the tort claims arose out of the real 
estate transaction, fees were properly awarded under the real estate contract. Similarly, in this 
case, the other claims clearly are connected with the real estate contract, and thus, attorney fees 
are proper under that contract even without the contract claims. The Respondent in this case, like 
the plaintiff in Le mer, brought a fraud claim for misrepresentations in the execution of the real 
estate contract and the District Court in this case, like the Court in Lerner, should have awarded 
attorney fees under the broad language of the Property Sale Agreement. 
In sum, the plain language of the Property Sale Agreement is broad, and provides for 
attorney fees in this case because Appellant was forced to defend an action "connected" with the 
Property Sale Agreement. The District Court's narrow interpretation of the parties' Agreement, 
holding that the Agreement only provides for attorney fees in actions to enforce the Agreement 
itself, is not supported by the plain language of the Agreement and should be reversed. 
B. The District Court Erred In Holding That Fees Were Not 
Allowed Under The Commercial Transaction Language Of 
I.C. § 12-120(3) 
As noted above, a prevailing party is entitled to an award of attorney fees only if a 
contract or statute provides for such award. In this respect, Idaho Code section 12-120(3) 
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"[i]n civil to recover on .. 
by law, the prevailing party shall be allowed a reasonable attorney's fee .... " l.C. § 12-
120(3 ). A "commercial transaction" is defined as any transaction "except transactions for 
personal or household purposes." Id. The conveyance of real property may constitute a 
commercial transaction. See Brown v. Greenheart, 157 Idaho 156,168,335 P.3d 1, 13 (2014); 
Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214,216, 159 P.3d 851,853 (2007). 
In this case, all of the claims stemmed from a commercial transaction between 
Respondent and Appellant for the sale and alleged repurchase of real property used by 
Respondent as both a residence and a business and purchased by Appellant for investment 
purposes. At trial, Appellant testified that he owned another residence in which he resided and 
that his intent was to use the purchased property as a rental. Respondent testified that he ran a 
car trim restoration business out of the property, and the purpose of the alleged buy back 
agreement was to allow him to continue to operate that business and provide for his family. 
In reaching the conclusion that the gravamen of this action was not a "commercial 
transaction," the District Court held that the Respondent's purpose was not commercial in nature: 
Here, Defendant contends that he had a commercial purpose in 
purchasing the property and that Plaintiff ran a business on the 
property, in addition to residing on the property. However, 
Defendant's purchase of the property was not at issue in this case. 
Instead, the gravamen of this case was Plaintiffs claim that there 
was a contract between the parties for Defendant to re-convey the 
property to Plaintiff after Defendant purchased it. Based on the 
record. there is no question that Plaintiffs purpose was to retain 
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his residential property free of his existing mortgage obligation. 
Plaintiffs purpose was not related to his business on the propertv. 
So, even if Defendant had a business purpose, the lack of such a 
purpose on Plaintiffs part precludes a finding of "the required 
symmetry of purpose" for application of section 12-120(3). 
Order On Motions, at 11, R. at 157 (emphasis added). The District Court erred in concluding 
that the record supported the fact that Respondent's purpose was only residential and was "not 
related to his business." In fact, the clear evidence in the record establishes that the 
Respondent's purpose in retaining the property and seeking a reconveyance was to keep his 
business going as a means to provide for his family. 
Respondent testified that he had a business of restoring car parts and trim, and that when 
he was laid off from United he was able to support his family with that business: 
A. I had a hobby of restoring car parts and trim. I had got to 
the point where I felt I could sustain an income with that. So that's 
when I seriously delved into it, investing in some equipment and 
working full-time and making my hobby my business where I 
actually restored car parts and trim. 
Q. And were you able to earn enough from restoring trim to 
support your family at this time that you're laid off from United? 
A. It was tough, but I did it, yes. 
Q. And what were you doing for work in this 2011 summer 
timeframe 
A. Restoring car parts. 
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at 13, ll. IL In 11, at a time was car parts out of the 
business on the property which is the subject of this action, Respondent contacted Justin 
McCarthy about short sales. Respondent testified that he contacted Mr. McCarthy in an attempt 
to keep his home, his business. and support his family: 
Q. And what specifically did you hope to accomplish when 
you contacted Mr. McCarthy? 
A. It was an effort to keep my home, keep my business, and 
support mv familv. 
David Kosmann Testimony, Tr., at 16, 11. 15-18 (emphasis added). This is consistent with the 
testimony of Justin McCarthy that Respondent contacted him in an attempt to stay in the property 
because he had a business that he ran out of the property: 
Q. Okay. And during your initial meeting with Mr. 
Kosmann, do you recall what he told you? 
A. The general general feel of it was that he is - he 
was looking to try and do a sale of his property and 
stay with - do a rent back of something along those 
lines within the same property, because he has a -
a business that he runs out of that property. 
Justin McCarthy Testimony, Tr. at 166, 11. 17-23 (emphasis added). 
Respondent stated at numerous points in his testimony that keeping his business and 
supporting his family was an important part of his motivation in entering into the transaction 
with Appellant to sell his property and then rent and buy it back. When asked about his purpose 
in entering into the arrangement with Appellant, Respondent testified it was to keep his home 
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business: 
Q. What was your reason this purchase and sale 
agreement, Mr. Kossman? 
A. My reason was to keep my home and to keep my 
business that I could still support my family through 
these hard times. 
David Kossman Testimony, Tr. at 19, 11. 6-10. Respondent testified that under his oral 
agreement to stay in the property his purpose was to continue living there and continue running 
his business: 
Q. And under this agreement with Mr. Gilbride, were you 
going to continue living at the property? 
A Absolutely. 
Q. Continue running your trim business at the property? 
A Yes. 
Id. Tr. at 30, 11. 22-25; 31, 11. 1-2. 
This is also consistent with what Respondent told Appellant about his purpose in selling 
the property and staying in is after the sale. When questioned by Respondent's own attorney at 
trial, Appellant testified as follows: 
Q. . .. And during these discussions you had with Dave during 
the summer of 2012, leading up to and even beyond the 
execution of this agreement, you understood that Dave ran 
his trim restoration business from the shop on his property? 
A Yes. 
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Q. And that was his source 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that part of his desire in keeping his property was 
being able to continue his business to support his kids? 
Q. Any you understood that was his sole source of income to 
support his kids? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And that was an egually important part of his 
desire to keep his property so he could continue 
making money? 
A. Yes. 
Leo Gilbride Testimony, Tr. at 241, 11. 23-25; 242, 11. 1-7, 24-25; 243, 11. 1-4 (emphasis added). 
There is no dispute that Appellant was purchasing the property as an investment: "I told 
him. 'I'm buying it as an investor.'" Leo Gilbride Testimony, Tr. at 319, IL 24. See also Tr. 321, 
11. 2-6. Thus, the evidence supports that the real estate sale was a commercial transaction for 
both the Respondent and the Appellant. 
Idaho Courts have clearly held that "the existence of a residence on the property does not 
automatically disqualify a land conveyance from being a commercial transaction." Brown v. 
Greenlzeart, 157 Idaho 156, 168, 335 P.3d 1, 13 (2014) (citing Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 
219, 159 P.3d 851, 856 (holding sale of property was commercial transaction where the land was 
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both a family retreat for logging); Herrick v. Leuzinger, 127 Idaho 293, 900 
1, 214 (Ct App. 1995) (holding lease of property was a commercial transaction where the 
property was for commercial ranching but a residence was maintained on the property)). Thus, 
the mere fact that Respondent also resided on the Property does not disqualify the sale from 
being a commercial transaction. 
Brown v. Greenlieart involved a dispute over the sale of a portion of land in Elmore 
County and whether water rights were transferred with the property. 157 Idaho at 159,335 P.3d 
at 1. At the conclusion of the case, the District Court awarded attorney fees under 12-120(3 ), 
finding that a commercial transaction was the gravamen of the lawsuit and awarded attorney fees 
to the sellers. Id. at 160, 335 P.3d at 5. Specifically, the District Court held that even though the 
seller's house was on a portion of the property, the property was large and was also used for 
agriculture. In upholding the decision of the District Court, the Supreme Court noted that: 
The District Court's finding that the Brown's sale of a portion of 
their property to Greenheart constituted a transaction for a 
commercial purpose is supported by the evidence. The Browns 
owned 320 acres that the used for ranching and farming - operation 
on which the Browns relied to derive income. 
Id. at 167,335 P.3d at 12. While the portion of the land sold by the Browns did not include the 
house, the Supreme Court specifically held that "the existence of a residence on the property does 
not automatically disqualify a land conveyance from being a commercial transaction." Id. at 168, 
335 P.3d at 13. Thus, the Court in Brown did not address the specific issue in this case because 
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not not been able to 
locate an Idaho case directly on point However, the Brown decision clearly left the door open to 
a finding a commercial transaction even if a residence were located on the property. The 
property in this case did contain a residence on one of the acres, but it also included two shops 
and another acre of bare ground where cars \Vere stored. Tr. at 6, 11. 5-9. 
The fact that Appellant's purpose in purchasing the property was entirely commercial in 
nature and the fact that Respondent was certainly motivated in large part by the desire to keep his 
business property so he could support his family, leads to the conclusion that a commercial 
transaction between the parties was the gravamen of the action. The District Court erred in 
concluding that Respondent's purpose was onlv residential and was "not related to his business." 
R. at 157. In fact, the clear evidence in the record establishes that the Respondent's purpose in 
retaining the property and seeking a reconveyance was to keep his business going as a means to 
provide for his family. Thus, the gravamen of the action was commercial in nature and attorney 
fees are proper under LC. 12-120(3). 
C. Appellant is Entitled to Attorney Fees On Appeal 
Appellant seeks costs and attorney fees on appeal pursuant to the language of the Real 
Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement (hereafter "Agreement"), \vhich provides as follows: 
28. ATTORNEY'S FEES: If either party initiates or defends any 
arbitration or legal action or proceedings which are in any way 
connected with this Agreement, the prevailing party is entitled to 
recover from the non-prevailing party, reasonable costs and 
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at at 
underlying la\vsuit, and in the event Appellant prevails in this appeal, he is entitled to an award 
of costs and fees on appeal pursuant to the plain language of the agreement between the parties. 
Additionally, "[i]t is \Vell established that§ 12-i20(3) mandates an award of attorney fees to the 
prevailing party on appeal as well as in the trial court." Nelson r. Anderson Lumber Co., 140 
Idaho 702, 716, 99 P.3d 1092, 1106 (Ct. App. 2004). 
IY. CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing. the Appellant respectfully requests the judgment of the District 
Court be reversed, and that Appellant be awarded his attorney fees in the underlying action and 
on appeal. 
DATED this I J1h day of February, 2016. 
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I hereby certify that on the 11th , 2016, tvrn true correct copies of the 
foregoing were served upo~arties listed below by: 
D U.S. Mail D Fax D By Hand D Overnight 
Greener Burke 
950 W. Bannock St., Suite 950 
Boise, ID 83702 
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